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 TRACKING CRIMINALS WITH INTERNET PROTOCOL ADDRESSES: 
IS LAW ENFORCEMENT CORRECTLY IDENTIFYING 
PERPETRATORS? 
Erin Larson∗ 
Technology’s ever-changing pace has left law enforcement 
officials with the job of finding legal ways to investigate and 
search suspected criminal activity. The advent of the Internet has 
left these officials with a challenging landscape to navigate 
regarding what is considered a search and what constitutes 
probable cause to obtain a search warrant based on a suspect’s 
online activity. As seen in various high-profile crimes, the 
technology-savvy individual can easily disguise and misdirect the 
IP addresses they use, notably when trying to hide illegal activity. 
This Recent Development argues that law enforcement must tread 
carefully when using Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses to obtain 
search warrants for suspected criminal activity because of the 
inherently unreliable information these addresses provide. 
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An IP address is analogous to a phone number in that both 
serve as a unique identifier for a particular device.1 Similar to how 
a phone number is assigned to a telephone device, an IP address is 
assigned to a specific computer.2 Furthermore, each router that a 
device uses to connect to the Internet also has an IP address 
assigned by the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), comparable to 
how a phone number is assigned by the phone provider.3 Just as a 
                                                            
 1 Cale Guthrie Weissman, What Is an IP Address and What Can It Reveal 
About You?, BUSINESS INSIDER: TECH INSIDER (May 18, 2015, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/ip-address-what-they-can-reveal-about-you-
2015-5. 
 2 Weissman, supra note 1; see also What is Network Address Translation, 
WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, http://whatismyipaddress.com/nat (last visited Jan. 
17, 2017) (explaining that matters become complicated when users connect all 
of their devices, such as home computers, cell phones, and iPads, to a single IP 
address). 
 3 Weissman, supra note 1. The IP address of a router is assigned by the 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) who manufactured the router (for example, 
Comcast or AT&T). It is difficult to identify the IP address for an individual’s 
computer by looking at Internet usage; rather, the IP address an investigator 
would likely locate first is that of the router, which is assigned by an ISP. Id. 
318 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 316 
person would dial a given number to reach a specific individual, 
the assigned IP address allows various devices connected to the 
Internet to “talk” to each other so that data can be shared among 
them.4 Each time a user visits a website, the website logs their IP 
address.5 With this information, the website can keep a record of 
who visits the site via tracking the IP addresses that accessed the 
site, similar to how phone companies keep a log of their users’ 
calls.6 
An IP address can be obtained easily, and various websites 
offer free services to track down a desired address.7 Finding a 
specific user’s IP address, however, can be more difficult and is 
complicated by factors such as whether the IP address is static or 
dynamic8 and whether the user was on an unsecured or secured 
network.9 The ISP supplies their customers with a router and the 
                                                            
 4  Weissman, supra note 1. 
 5 R. Kayne, Do Websites Track and Record IP Addresses?, WISEGEEK, 
http://www.wisegeek.org/do-websites-track-and-record-ip-addresses.htm (last 
modified Jan. 20, 2017). A website’s server sends the computer’s browser an IP 
address when it “accepts” the request from the user’s computer. When the page 
loads, the website often records the IP address that loads the webpage. Websites 
often choose to keep a log of the IP addresses that access their site for analytical 
purposes. Id. 
 6  Kayne, supra note 5. 
 7  See Amandine Markham, How to Trace an IP Address, WIKIHOW: 
INTERNET SECURITY (March 2, 2015), http://www.wikihow.com/Trace-an-IP-
Address (“[t]racing an IP address is fairly simple”). 
 8  There are two types of IP addresses: static and dynamic. Most ISPs have 
moved to assigning dynamic IP addresses to their networks, which assign the 
number only when users connect to the Internet, meaning the addresses change 
over time. Alternatively, static IP addresses never change, and these are less 
common among users. See Static vs. Dynamic IP Addresses, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/fiber/answer/3547208?hl=en (last visited Jan. 13, 
2017). 
 9  There are secured and unsecured networks. Anyone can access an unsecured 
network because the network has no protections in place to limit access, for 
example a Wi-Fi connection that requires no password. Also, because more IP 
addresses are dynamic now, everyone who logs on the Internet at the local 
coffee shop could potentially have the same IP address. See United States v. 
Broadhurst, No. 3:11–cr–00121–MO–1, 2012 WL 5985615, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 
28, 2012) (noting that due to unsecured wireless networks, it was impossible to 
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associated IP address, meaning the public can only identify the 
router’s IP address, which oftentimes does not provide personally 
identifying information because it does not identify the network 
within an individual’s home.10 Therefore, this IP address is 
analogous to locating the phone tower that a cell phone connected 
to, rather than the actual phone used. These factors play an 
important role in the reliability and specificity of information that 
the IP address reveals to law enforcement officials.11 
Using IP addresses can be a valuable tool for law enforcement 
officials to begin their search to locate criminals through their 
Internet usage, because virtually everyone uses the Internet in 
some capacity. This means nearly every criminal inevitably leaves 
a trail each time he or she uses the Internet. However, officials’ use 
of IP addresses to obtain search warrants creates Fourth 
Amendment privacy concerns, typically in the steps taken after an 
IP address is known.12 In particular, Internet Service Providers, 
                                                                                                                                     
conclude the source of child pornography file-sharing solely by using an IP 
address). 
 10  Weissman, supra note 1. Courts have used this fact to conclude that a 
search warrant is not needed to obtain a user’s IP address in the first place 
because it does not lead to personally identifying information. See United States 
v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at *5 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (“When a consumer purchases a computer, takes it home, 
opens it up, and turns it on, that computer does not have an IP address. Instead, 
it is assigned an IP address by an internet service provider (like Time Warner) 
when it connects to a particular network, and that IP address may change if the 
computer connects to a different network.”). 
 11 See Dynamic IP vs Static IP, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, 
http://whatismyipaddress.com/dynamic-static (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). 
Additionally, dynamic IP addresses make it more difficult to accurately locate 
someone via their IP address because it changes. With a static IP address, geo-
location services are more accurate and more expensive. Id. 
 12 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment concerns typically 
arise in the additional steps that law enforcement officials take after obtaining an 
IP address to physically locate where the defendant is. See, e.g., Acevedo-Lemus, 
2016 WL 4208436, at *5 (explaining how Defendant’s assertion that the 
government’s use of malware to obtain his IP address was not a Fourth 
Amendment search “because an IP address is not a private physical feature of a 
computer, but a commonly disclosed digital one assigned by a third party[,]” 
leaving the Defendant with no subjective expectation of privacy). However, 
some have found the courts’ reasoning to allow a foray into more intrusive ways 
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such as Comcast and AT&T, are subject to court subpoenas to 
provide personal information about their users.13 Some privacy 
experts indicate that ISPs will become more reluctant to disclose 
this information readily, however, because of the burgeoning 
concerns about keeping customer information private.14 This 
technique has become less reliable, though, as tech smart criminals 
have found ways to circumvent tracking via IP address searches.15 
This Recent Development argues that IP addresses alone 
should not provide sufficient probable cause to obtain a search 
warrant and that more substantive information should be required 
                                                                                                                                     
to obtain IP addresses and warn that “[w]hat matters is how the government 
obtain[s] the information,” calling for caution in the techniques law enforcement 
uses to not only obtain IP address information, but also the steps taken after an 
IP address is known. See Orin Kerr, Remotely Accessing an IP Address Inside a 




 13 ISPs are subject to court subpoenas and must provide the information 
requested in the subpoena. See, e.g., Privacy Policy: Information We Share, 
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/#nosharing (last visited Feb. 
16, 2017) (stating in their privacy policies that Google will “share personal 
information . . . [to] meet any . . . legal process or enforceable government 
request.”). All ISPs are “provider[s] of electronic communication service” under 
the Stored Communications Act and are therefore subject to required disclosures 
upon proper governmental request. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703 (2012) (stating warrants must be issued in accordance with the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure). ISPs are ordered to disclose the subscriber’s 
name, address, length of service, and source of payment for the service. See id. 
§ 2703(c)(2). 
 14 There are growing privacy concerns of companies like Apple and Yahoo 
providing user information to government officials; concerns over the policies of 
ISPs are also expected to arise. See generally Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE 
PROCESS, https://digitaldueprocess.org/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (stating a 
mission of “providing stronger privacy protections for communications and 
associated data in response to changes in technology and new services and usage 
patterns, while preserving the legal tools necessary for government agencies to 
enforce the laws, respond to emergency circumstances and protect the public”). 
 15  This can be done through use of public Wi-Fi, the Tor network, and Virtual 
Private Networks (“VPNs”). See generally Larry Greenemeier, Back to Hackers, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN: TECH (June 11, 2011), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tracking-cyber-hackers/. 
APRIL 2017]Tracking Criminals with Internet Protocol Addresses 321 
to issue a warrant. Part II provides background on the current law 
governing the use of IP addresses to obtain search warrants. Part 
III discusses how law enforcement officials obtain search warrants 
with IP address information and explores the reliability, or lack 
thereof, regarding this information. Part IV explores what 
additional information should be provided, in addition to an IP 
address, in order for a search warrant to be lawfully granted in a 
manner that does not infringe on constitutional rights. Part V 
discusses the privacy concerns with current and future methods 
law enforcement officials use to obtain identifying information. 
II. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT LAW 
Cyberspace crime challenges the breadth of law enforcement 
investigative techniques, creating a murky line between a user’s 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy16 and law enforcement’s duty 
to apprehend criminals. Privacy surrounding Internet use has 
presented courts with challenging questions of exactly how much 
privacy users should reasonably expect when they enter cyberspace 
and the methods law enforcement officials can use when finding 
cyber criminals.17 Generally, federal courts have reached an 
(almost) unanimous consensus that when users enter the cyber 
domain, privacy rights cease to exist.18  
                                                            
 16  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (granting citizens the right “to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures 
. . . and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”). 
 17 Compare United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 120 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(holding Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
Internet signals he intentionally projected outside of his home, so the signal 
sensing device that detectives used to locate him did not require a warrant), with 
United States v. Croghan, No. 1:15-cr-48, 2016 WL 4992105, at *7 (S.D. Iowa 
Sept. 19, 2016) (finding the Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his IP address when the government obtained it by searching his computer, 
even though Defendant “lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the information actually gathered”). 
 18 See, e.g., United States v. Broadhurst, No. 3:11–cr–00121–MO–1, 2012 
WL 5985615, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012) (“A defendant who connects to the 
Internet by hijacking his neighbor’s wireless network does not have a privacy 
interest in the signals coming from his house that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.”). But see Croghan, 2016 WL 4992105, at *7 
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The Supreme Court has determined that one’s expectation of 
privacy is a two-fold inquiry: first, a user must have a subjective 
expectation of privacy; and second, society must view this 
expectation as reasonable.19 When engaging in conduct on the 
Internet, courts have found that “Internet users do not have 
reasonable expectations of privacy in their own IP addresses or the 
IP addresses of the websites they visit”20 because this information 
is available to others,21 not just to law enforcement officials during 
investigation.22 Due to the advent of free online services, anyone 
can trace an IP address.23 Additionally, when law enforcement 
officials obtain IP address information from third parties, 
specifically from ISPs, courts have concluded that because users 
voluntarily disclosed this information to third parties,24 there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.25 The 
                                                                                                                                     
(explaining the FBI’s search of Defendant’s computer through the use of 
malware to locate his IP address was an unconstitutional search because there 
was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his computer, despite 
the fact he used the Internet for illegal activity). 
 19 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
This two-step requirement is used routinely today by courts when evaluating 
expectation of privacy matters. Id. See also United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 
584, 589 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 20  United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 
4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016). 
 21 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (ruling people do not have an 
expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily disclose to others). 
 22  See Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 (citing United States v. 
Martinez, 588 F. App’x 741 (Mem.) (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). 
 23 See Markham, supra note 7. 
 24 United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Federal courts 
have uniformly held that subscriber information provided to an internet provider 
is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation.”). The 
information disclosed often includes name, address, phone number, and other 
information that ISPs may require when registering a router for Internet service. 
Comcast Legal Response Center, Law Enforcement Handbook, COMCAST 1, 14 
(Rev. May 1, 2015), 
http://www.comcast.com/~/Media/403EEED5AE6F46118DDBC5F8BC436030.
ashx. 
 25 Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4. For example, Google explicitly 
states in their privacy policy terms they collect information that is used, and 
often required, to create a Google Account and will share this information when 
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consensus among the courts is that Internet activity, including IP 
address information, is not a “private” activity that society 
considers protectable under the Fourth Amendment.26 Targeted 
advertisements,27 Find My iPhone,28 and other valuable location 
services that people utilize every day are available because Internet 
activity is not private. This has all contributed to the notion that 
users should not assume a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
online conduct, specifically with respect to IP addresses.29 
                                                                                                                                     
the government properly requests it. See Privacy Policy: Information We Share, 
supra note 13. 
 26 Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 (“Internet users have no 
expectation of privacy in the . . . IP addresses of the websites they visit because 
they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet 
service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing information.”) 
(quoting United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007)). One 
court even went so far as to recognize that “society’s view of the Internet . . . has 
undergone a drastic shift[,]” changing the “corresponding expectation of 
privacy” in that information. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 618 
(E.D. Va. 2016). On the contrary, defendants often argue that Internet activity 
conducted inside of their home is a private activity because they are protected by 
the walls of their home. See for example United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 
120–21 (3d Cir. 2014), where Defendant attempted to use the successful defense 
from Kyllo, that the home acts as a shield to keep activities conducted within the 
walls from public observation, but the court declined to follow this reasoning 
with respect to Internet activity. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 
(2001). 
 27 Targeted advertisements are directed at individuals and are generated 
through tracking technology that companies use on web sites. See Darla 
Cameron, How Targeted Advertising Works, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/business/how-targeted-
advertising-works/412/. 
 28 Find My iPhone allows users to locate their phone when it is lost. When the 
device is online, the phone’s location can be found using GPS technology. See 
Find My iPhone, ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/find-my-
iphone/id376101648?mt=8 (last visited Jan. 27, 2017). 
 29 United States v. Johnson, No. 15-00340-01-CR-W-GAF, 2016 WL 
6136586, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2016) (finding “[Defendant] did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address because [Defendant’s] 
subjective expectation of privacy simply is one that society is not prepared to 
recognize as reasonable”). Interestingly, courts have begun to rely on society’s 
understanding and expectation that Internet activity is no longer considered by 
many to be private. See generally id. (“The concept of an interest in privacy that 
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Concerns arise when law enforcement makes use of this 
“public” information in a way that seems to be more invasive.30 
Once police have obtained an IP address, additional steps are 
usually taken to pinpoint the location of the suspected criminal.31 
These additional steps are what defendants usually allege as 
invasions of privacy.32 Defendants typically argue that they have a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of [their] 
computer,”33 and when law enforcement uses techniques that allow 
them to view that content without a warrant, their Fourth 
Amendment rights are violated.34 However, these additional 
“invasive” steps are typically necessary for law enforcement to 
obtain search warrants, because although an IP address alone will 
narrow down the suspect list, it rarely leads directly to the 
suspect.35 To illustrate, suppose a criminal goes to Starbucks and 
                                                                                                                                     
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically 
different from the mere expectation . . . that certain facts will not come to the 
attention of the authorities.”) (quoting United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 
122, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (1984)). 
 30 See, e.g., Stanley, 735 F.3d at 116–17 (considering Fourth Amendment 
implications of detective’s warrantless use of a “MoocherHunter” to locate the 
suspect based on the wireless signals transmitted from his home). 
 31 See id.; United States v. Broadhurst, No. 3:11-cr-00121-MO-1, 2012 WL 
5985615, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012). 
 32 See, e.g., Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615, at *1 (using “the Shadow”) 
(discussed infra Section III.B); Stanley, 735 F.3d at 114 (using a 
“MoocherHunter”) (discussed infra Section III.B). 
 33 United States v. Allain, No. 15-cr-10251, 2016 WL 5660452, at *13 n.5 (D. 
Mass. Sept. 29, 2016) (holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in contents on a computer). 
 34 See Kerr, supra note 12 (“Government access to information stored inside a 
suspect’s computer without permission is a search regardless of whether the 
information has been voluntarily revealed in some other way to someone else.”). 
This argument was made in the Playpen cases, where the FBI sent malware to 
registered computers of a child pornography website to learn their IP address, 
which was obtained by looking at the contents on the user’s computer. See, e.g., 
United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 
4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016). 
 35 See generally Hoschar v. Layne, 647 F.App’x 632, 634 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(where suspect connected to a stranger’s network and the network owner was 
accused and arrested for the illegal activity); United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 
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connects to an unsecured (non-password-protected) Wi-Fi network 
to conduct illegal cyber activity. When this connection to an 
unsecured network is made, courts have held that the defendant no 
longer has a “reasonable expectation of privacy in signals he 
intentionally emitted to connect to unauthorized networks.”36 
Matters are further complicated when criminals use dark web 
browsers37 to remain private. Dark web browsers attempt to 
safeguard user’s information by allowing “users to access the 
Internet in an anonymous fashion,” helping users to remain private 
on the seemingly non-private web.38 The advantage of using a dark 
web browser, particularly for criminal activity, is that the IP 
address location is hidden, and therefore not easily ascertainable.39 
However, even on a dark web browser, an IP address is still 
provided when the user is on the network.40 The difference is that 
these browsers will anonymize the originating user, similar to 
making a private phone call where “No Caller ID” or “Blocked 
                                                                                                                                     
114, 115–16 (3d Cir. 2014) (where IP address was traced to neighbor’s home 
because suspect connected to her network). 
 36 Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615, at *5; see also Stanley, 735 F.3d at 119–20 
(finding that Defendant’s conduct of sharing child pornography with other 
Internet users on a stranger’s Internet connection “deliberately projected outside 
of his home, as it required interactions with persons and objects beyond the 
threshold of his residence.”). 
 37 An example is the Tor network, which is an anonymous web browser that 
allows users to connect through “virtual tunnels rather than making a direct 
connection,” allowing users greater privacy. Tor: Overview, TOR, 
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited Jan. 10, 2017). 
 38 United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 593 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 39 “Although a website’s operator usually can identify visitors to his or her site 
through the visitors’ Internet Protocol (‘IP’) addresses, Tor attempts to keep a 
user’s IP address hidden.” Id. at 593–94 (explaining how the Tor network, a 
popular dark web browser, operates). See also Tor: Overview, supra note 37 
(“[i]ndividuals use Tor to keep websites from tracking them and their family 
members” and to protect against Internet surveillance). A high-profile example 
of a site hosted on the Tor network is The Silk Road, where users were 
trafficking drugs and weapons, among other illegal activities. See Donna 
Leinwand Leger, How FBI Brought Down Cyber-Underworld Site Silk Road, 
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/21/fbi-
cracks-silk-road/2984921/ (last updated May 15, 2014). 
 40 See also Tor: Overview, supra note 37. 
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Number” appears on the receiver’s phone.41 Courts have not been 
persuaded by this attempt at anonymity and have found that the IP 
addresses were still part of the public domain because the IP 
address still needs to be disclosed to the network initially, meaning 
that an individual cannot use these browsers without first revealing 
his or her IP address.42 A user must still initially “disclos[e] his 
identifying information to complete strangers” in order to use the 
browsers, thereby “taking a significant gamble on any real 
expectation of privacy under these circumstances.”43 This could be 
loosely likened to a person using a Post Office (“P.O.”) Box, 
where the user only reveals his personal address to the Postal 
Service and provides everyone else with the P.O. Box address. The 
user is actively taking steps to conceal his personal address, but in 
order to do so he had to provide that address to a third party 
helping him remain private. 
III. USING IP ADDRESSES TO OBTAIN SEARCH WARRANTS 
Law enforcement officials use IP addresses to obtain search 
warrants because IP addresses are viewed as public knowledge.44 
To obtain a search warrant, law enforcement officials must present 
                                                            
 41 Id. 
 42 United States v. Michaud, No. CR15-5351RJB 2016, WL 337263 at *7 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (“Although the IP addresses of users utilizing the 
Tor network may not be known to websites, . . . using the Tor network does not 
strip users of all anonymity, because users accessing [website at issue] must still 
send and receive information, including IP addresses, through another computer, 
such as an Internet Service Provider, at a specific physical location. Even though 
difficult for the Government to secure that information tying the IP address to 
Mr. Michaud, the IP address was public information, like an unlisted telephone 
number, and eventually could have been discovered.”); see also United States v. 
Johnson, No. 15-00340-01-CR-W-GAF, 2016 WL 6136586, at *3 (W.D. Mo. 
Oct. 20, 2016) (“Defendant had no expectation in the privacy of his IP address, 
even when using the Tor network.”). 
 43 United States v. Farrell, No. CR15-029RAJ, 2016 WL 705197, at *2 (W.D. 
Wa. Feb. 23, 2016). 
 44 See generally Hoschar v. Layne, 647 F. App’x 632, 633 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(where police detectives searched and arrested an innocent man based on an IP 
address); United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 116–17 (3d Cir. 2014) (where 
detective observed Internet signal strengths after investigating several suspect IP 
addresses). 
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evidence, through affidavits, as to the nature of the probable cause 
for the search.45 At first, search warrants were granted after 
officials presented only an IP address and information from the ISP 
as probable cause, which in turn did not directly lead investigators 
to the suspect.46 The identifying information provided by the ISP 
typically only includes the router owner’s name, home address, 
and payment information, but the router owner is often not the 
person conducting the illegal activity.47 For example, when a UNC 
student illegally downloads content while connected to the 
University’s network, the download is traced back to the 
University generally, not to the specific student. Therefore, the 
University then must do additional work to identify the student or 
students responsible for the activity.48 The same is true for router 
owners. Consequently, router owners have had their personal 
computers searched when they had no connection to the crime 
other than the fact that the suspect connected to their network 
router.49 This section will explore illustrative examples of how 
                                                            
 45 The Fourth Amendment does not define “probable cause” but the Supreme 
Court has reasoned that probable cause exists if the magistrate has a substantial 
basis to believe there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place.” See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 
(1983). 
 46 Hoschar, 647 F. App’x at 633 (where a search warrant was granted with 
only IP address information). 
 47 For example, some of the customer information that Comcast collects is a 
customer’s name, service address, billing address, e-mail address, telephone 
number, driver’s license number, social security number, bank account number, 
and credit card number (although “typically not all” of this information is 
collected for each customer). See Comcast Customer Privacy Notice: 
Disclosure, XFINITY (Aug. 1, 2015), 
https://www.xfinity.com/Corporate/Customers/Policies/CustomerPrivacy.html#. 
In Stanley, detectives subpoenaed Comcast for a subscriber’s name and home 
address associated with an IP address. Stanley, 753 F.3d at 115-16. 
 48 Morgan Baskin, Think Twice Before Illegally DownloadingIntellectual 
Property Companies are Watching You, USA TODAY COLLEGE (March 5, 
2015), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/03/05/think-twice-before-illegally-
downloading-intellectual-property-companies-are-watching-you/. 
 49 See, e.g., Stanley, 753 F.3d at 116 (observing that the “search revealed that 
none of the Neighbor’s computers contained [] child pornography”). 
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police have used IP addresses and other techniques to garner more 
information after knowing an IP address. 
A. Illustrative Cases of Evidence Provided for Search Warrants 
Law enforcement officials have frequently linked online 
criminal activity with an IP address and obtained a search warrant 
with this information. In United States v. Coca,50 officials searched 
the defendant’s home after the investigating officer provided an 
affidavit outlining the number of e-mails exchanged, the IP address 
of a computer, and the name and street address associated with the 
IP address from a subpoena to the ISP, Comcast.51 The defendant 
challenged the issuance of the search warrant, alleging the small 
amount of information offered to obtain the warrant did not 
provide “a sufficient nexus that evidence of criminal activity 
would be found at” his address.52 Based on his home’s location 
near a college campus, he argued that the e-mail account that sent 
over sixty e-mails containing child pornography was a random, 
temporary user who accessed his account from a device not located 
within his home.53 The court ultimately ruled that the high volume 
of e-mails sent from the account, and the short period of time the 
account was “inactive” before the warrant was served, gave the 
magistrate information that was “more than sufficient to 
demonstrate probable cause that evidence of criminal activity . . . 
would be found.”54 Coca provides an example where the police 
had substantive evidence in addition to the IP address to justify 
issuing a search warrant. However, Coca is somewhat of an outlier 
when it comes to an IP address leading to the criminal’s location. 
In a rather extreme example, the property of Joyce Taylor in 
Potwin, Kansas became the default IP address location for over a 
decade for MaxMind, an IP address geo-location company that 
maintains a database of IP address locations used by approximately 
                                                            
 50 U.S. v. Coca, No. 14-262, 2016 WL 7013037 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2016). 
 51  Id. at 2-3. 
 52  Id. at 6. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. at 6-7. 
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5,000 companies.55 When their database cannot identify a location, 
Taylor’s home becomes the default.56 Her home has been 
associated with over 600 million IP addresses, and linked to 
runaway children, identity thieves, suicidal veterans, and 
scammers.57 The residents alleged they have been subject to 
“repeated visits and calls by law enforcement officers, at all hours 
of the day and night . . . [and] private individuals have attempted to 
enter their property . . . [and] access their Internet.”58 An IP 
address alone has caused this Kansas home to become a “criminal 
hotspot.”59 
Similarly, in cases where a criminal has connected to an 
unsecured network, law enforcement officials have obtained 
warrants to search the home of these network owners. Oftentimes, 
the network owners are not the ones who committed the crime. A 
pastor in Pittsburg, Tennessee, David Hoschar, endured eighteen 
months of investigations and court proceedings, including an arrest 
and forced resignation from his church, because a search warrant 
was granted with only IP address information.60 An investigator 
discovered that images of child pornography were being 
downloaded from an IP address that was traced to the pastor’s 
                                                            
 55 See Kashmir Hill, How an Internet Mapping Glitch Turned a Random 
Kansas Farm into a Digital Hell, FUSION (Apr. 10, 2016, 10:00AM), 
http://fusion.net/story/287592/internet-mapping-glitch-kansas-farm/ (explaining 
companies would use MaxMind’s database when, for example, they want to 
identify a user who has been illegally downloading music). Some examples of 
companies who use MaxMind are Facebook and Google. Id. 
 56 Arnold v. MaxMind, Inc., No. 16-1309-JTM, 2016 WL 6124985, at *2 (D. 
Kan. Oct. 20, 2016). 
 57 See id.; see also Hill, supra note 55. 
 58  Arnold, 2016 WL 6124985, at *1. 
 59  Hill, supra note 55. 
 60  Hoschar v. Layne, 647 F. App’x 632, 632 (6th Cir. 2016) (this case was 
brought by the accused pastor against the principal investigating officers for 
giving false or misleading testimony to a grand jury in order to secure an 
indictment). See also Pam Sohn, Sohn: Where is Justice When Justice is Done?, 
TIMES FREE PRESS (May 14, 2016), 
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/opinion/times/story/2016/may/14/sohn-
where-justice-when-justice-done/365536/. 
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home and identified as belonging to his wife.61 There was no 
password on their router, and thus the network was unsecure.62 The 
investigator was granted a search warrant based on the IP address 
information and seized a computer and laptop from the home, of 
which neither had any trace of child pornography.63 When 
testifying before the grand jury, the police investigators did not 
explain that the Hoschar’s router was not password protected, a 
key fact given anyone in the vicinity of their home could have 
downloaded the images by connecting to their network.64 These 
mix-ups are not uncommon when only IP address information, 
even when coupled with personal data from ISPs, is used to obtain 
a search warrant.65 When technology easily provides for 
anonymity, law enforcement must demand more information in 
order to locate a suspect. In addition to an IP address, officials 
have used devices to identify the location of suspects once an IP 
address is known. 
B. Police Techniques Used in Conjunction with IP Addresses 
IP addresses unquestionably provide officials with a solid 
starting point to trace criminal activity. However, the addresses 
alone typically do not lead officials to the suspect.66 Therefore, law 
                                                            
 61 Hoschar, 647 F. App’x at 633. This information was obtained after the ISP 
was subpoenaed, specifically pointing to his wife. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 633–34. After the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation conducted an 
analysis, there was no sign of any downloaded images nor evidence that it was 
“scrubbed” of child pornography. 
 64 Id. at 634–35. The Hoschars additionally challenged that the investigators 
did not present that their home was located next to a motel, which would have 
led to an even larger suspect pool in addition to the unsecured router. 
 65 See Ansel Herz, Police Go on Fishing Expedition, Search the Home of 
Seattle Privacy Activists Who Maintain Tor Network, THE STRANGER (Mar. 30, 
2016, 12:56 PM), 
http://www.thestranger.com/slog/2016/03/30/23885710/police-go-on-fishing-
expedition-search-the-home-of-seattle-privacy-activists-who-maintain-tor-
network (commenting further that even Tor users are not immune from search 
warrants based on IP addresses). 
 66 See Hoschar, 647 F. App’x at 633; U.S. v. Coca, 2016 WL 7013037 (W.D. 
Pa. Dec. 1, 2016); Arnold v. MaxMind, Inc., 2016 WL 6124985 (D. Kan. Oct. 
20, 2016). 
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enforcement has developed more advanced techniques that use IP 
addresses as a starting point to launch more invasive searches.67 
In United States v. Broadhurst,68 detectives traced an IP 
address using a signal-locating device known as the Shadow.69 A 
detective discovered that child pornography photographs were 
being shared on a peer-to-peer network70 and traced the source to a 
particular neighborhood after identifying ten IP addresses that were 
sharing the photographs.71 After subpoenaing the ISPs for the ten 
IP addresses, the search was narrowed down to six addresses in the 
neighborhood; but, once again, the addresses were accessed 
through an unsecured wireless network.72 Knowing that unsecured 
networks lead to a much larger suspect range, the detective 
employed the Shadow device to narrow down the suspect pool.73 
The Shadow works by scanning the area for radio signals emitted 
by station devices (e.g., computers) and access points (e.g., 
wireless routers) that allow the devices to connect to each other, 
facilitating an Internet connection.74 By observing the signal 
strength, the operator can know if the station device or access point 
                                                            
 67 United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
29, 2016). 
 68 United States v. Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012). 
 69 The Shadow is a device that allows the user to observe and locate wireless 
access points (mechanisms, like routers, that allow wireless devices to connect 
to that network) and station devices (computers, tablets, smart phones) by 
receiving radio signals within the immediate area of the device. Id. at *2–3. 
 70 A Peer-to-Peer (“P2P”) network allows users to share files among 
themselves by connecting directly to another computer, providing an 
anonymized route of the traffic. See, e.g., Margaret Rouse, Peer-to-Peer (P2P), 
TECHTARGET: SEARCHNETWORKING, 
http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/definition/peer-to-peer (last updated 
Aug. 2014). When users are on a P2P network, a “peer” can search for files 
being shared on the network and download ones of interest. Broadhurst, 2012 
WL 5985615, at *12 n.1. Popular examples of P2P networks are Napster and 
BitTorrent. 
 71  Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615, at *1. 
 72  Id. (explaining that because users were accessing the photographs on an 
unsecured network, anyone could theoretically access the network as long as 
they were in the wireless range). 
 73  Id. at *2-3. 
 74  Id.  
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is close.75 In Broadhurst, as in other cases, it was determined that 
the router owner was not involved after their home was searched. 
However, when detectives used the Shadow while walking in the 
vicinity of the other suspected addresses, one address had a high 
signal spike that indicated the suspect was there.76 A search 
warrant was then obtained based on the information gathered using 
the Shadow.77 
The defendant argued that, before the Shadow could be used, 
law enforcement needed to first obtain a warrant because 
monitoring the signals emitted from his device constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search.78 He argued he had a constitutional right to 
privacy in the signals that the device analyzed.79 The federal court 
rejected this argument because the defendant, through his use of 
another’s network, voluntarily disclosed his IP address information 
to third parties.80 The Broadhurst court, agreeing with the Sixth 
Circuit, reasoned that “[w]hen criminals use modern technological 
devices to carry out criminal acts and to reduce the possibility of 
detection, they can hardly complain when the police take 
advantage of the inherent characteristics of those very devices to 
catch them.”81 
                                                            
 75  Id. Because the Shadow requires the user to select access points or station 
devices to observe, the user must have an idea of whom they wish to observe. In 
this case, the detective walked around the addresses in question with the device 
and observed the signal strength at each address to gather information. Id. 
 76  Id. at *3. 
 77  Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615, at *4. 
 78  Id. Defendant alleged it “intruded upon a constitutionally protected privacy 
interest” in the signals. Id. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. The court recognized a nuance when defendants use a third party’s 
unsecured network to avoid detection. “On the one hand, [the] defendant would 
serendipitously receive Fourth Amendment protection because he hijacked 
another person’s Internet connection to share child pornography files. On the 
other hand, another individual who uses his own Internet connection to share the 
same files lacks such protection, merely because the IP addresses would track 
back to his house . . . . [T]he court should not recognize an expectation of 
privacy in one case simply because one individual uses a hijacked wireless 
signal.” Id. at *5. 
 81 Id. at *5 (quoting United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 
2012)). 
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With an almost identical fact pattern to Broadhurst, the 
Pennsylvania Police Department in United States v. Stanley82 used 
a “MoocherHunter” to locate the person suspected of downloading 
child pornography.83 The detective discovered the user on a P2P 
network,84 found the IP address and subpoenaed the ISP for 
identifying information.85 Detectives then searched the router 
owner’s home, ultimately finding no evidence of child 
pornography but discovering that the router was not password-
protected.86 The detective left a police computer in the neighbor’s 
home connected to the router and was able to observe the suspect 
downloading the illegal images and obtain the suspect’s IP and 
MAC address.87 Without a search warrant,88 the detective was able 
to see when Stanley was sharing images and was able to identify 
Stanley’s IP address because the neighbor allowed the detective to 
observe who was connecting to his router.89 Once the detective 
knew the IP address, he used the “MoocherHunter” and determined 
Stanley’s apartment was the suspected place of the illegal 
                                                            
 82  United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 83 Id. at 115. The “MoocherHunter” is mobile tracking software, much like the 
Shadow device, that measures the signal strength of the radio waves emitted 
from the mooching device. The signal strength increases when the device is 
pointed towards where the mooching device is located. Id. at 116. The device is 
called the “MoocherHunter” because it is used to find those who are 
“mooching” off another person’s wireless router. Id. at 115. 
 84 See supra explanation in note 70. 
 85 Id. at 115–16. 
 86 Id. at 116. 
 87 Id. This information would have been available to anyone who was 
connected to the wireless router at that time. Id. A MAC (Media Access 
Control) address is assigned to network hardware adapters assigned by the 
provider. See What Is a MAC Address, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, 
http://whatismyipaddress.com/mac-address (last visited March 3, 2017). 
 88 Notably, the detective contacted the United States Attorney before 
proceeding with their investigation to inquire whether a search warrant was 
needed. They “discussed the practical impossibility of obtaining a search 
warrant without knowing which one of the many nearby residences the signal 
was being transmitted from,” and concluded that a warrant was not needed. 
Stanley, 753 F.3d at 117. 
 89 Id. at 116. 
334 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 316 
activity.90 With this information, the detective obtained a search 
warrant for Stanley’s home, finding 144 images and videos 
classified as child pornography.91 As seen in Hoschar, where 
strangers were connecting to the pastor’s unsecured network, the 
same was true in Stanley.92 Stanley was able to connect to his 
neighbor’s unsecured network in an attempt to avoid detection.93 
The detective in Stanley, however, was able to provide more 
substantive evidence to obtain a search warrant after using the 
MoocherHunter.94 This additional information was needed to 
accurately determine that Stanley was the suspect.95 Consequently, 
this type of information should be required in search warrants 
where the IP address associated with the router does not belong to 
the criminal. 
IV. WHAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN SEARCH WARRANTS 
As seen in the illustrative cases in Section III.B, searches 
conducted with information only obtained from a user’s IP address 
narrow the suspect list down to virtually anyone, anywhere, with 
access to a given network at a given time. The ability to narrow 
down the suspect list, often to a specific neighborhood or street, is 
undoubtedly helpful information. Therefore, this information—
when coupled with other techniques—can be lawfully utilized to 
gather substantive evidence before seeking a search warrant. It is 
evident that courts do not consider the wireless devices that law 
enforcement officials have used to be an illegal search under the 
Fourth Amendment. However, as technology and the techniques 
used to locate criminals become more advanced , an intrusion 
                                                            
 90 Id. at 117. 
 91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Stanley, 753 F.3d at 117. 
 94 See id. The detective knew the MAC address of the suspect because of the 
computer left at the neighbor’s house to observe who was connecting to the 
network, and the MoocherHunter then confirmed that the wireless signals 
connecting to the network were emitted from Stanley’s apartment. This 
additional investigation was needed after the IP address of the router was known 
to lead to the suspect. Id.  
95  Id.  
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further and further into people’s privacy is on the horizon. One 
such current technique includes sending malware to computers, 
which is viewed as more intrusive than using a device that reads 
wireless signals.96 This section will discuss factors that law 
enforcement officials should consider to ensure probable cause is 
established before seeking a search warrant. The privacy concerns 
implicated by vague search warrants, oftentimes including only IP 
address information, will also be explored. This includes how ISPs 
respond to subpoenas and the potential for greater resistance from 
ISPs moving forward. 
A. Further Investigation Should be Conducted to Meet the 
Probable Cause Standard 
Given the unreliable nature of an IP address when used to 
pinpoint the exact suspect in a crime, law enforcement officials 
should conduct a more thorough investigation before seeking a 
search warrant. The Fourth Amendment does not define what is 
required to establish probable cause before a search warrant is 
issued, but the Supreme Court has reasoned probable cause is 
found when “there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place.”97 An IP address simply does 
not meet this probable cause standard because, as seen in Section 
III, the IP address often leads to an innocent home where a 
criminal has been connecting to a network.98 
i. Unsecured Networks 
In addition to receiving information from the user’s ISP, one of 
the most important facts officers should determine is whether the 
network is secured or not.99 Unsecured networks should be a red 
                                                            
 96 See, e.g., United States v. Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 28, 2016) (describing the FBI’s use of a Network Investigative Technique 
(“NIT”) that sent malware to users that, when downloaded, sent identifying 
information back to the FBI, including the user’s IP address). 
 97 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
 98 See, e.g., Hoschar v. Layne, 647 F. App’x 632, 633 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 99 For instance, in Hoschar, a claim of malicious prosecution was brought 
against the detectives because they neglected to testify before the grand jury that 
the wrongfully accused had an unsecured Wi-Fi network, meaning that anyone 
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flag to investigators because they leave open a large pool of 
suspects. Anyone within the wireless range can connect, meaning 
suspects can look for unsecured networks to use as a shield for 
their physical location,100 as seen in Section III. Therefore, a search 
of the router owner’s home should not be conducted without more 
corroborating information pointing to them as a suspect.101 
Even on a secured network, it can be relatively simple for some 
users to hack into password-protected Wi-Fi, leading to a larger 
suspect pool even when secured networks are identified.102 Router 
                                                                                                                                     
within range could connect to the network. The detectives were ultimately 
protected by immunity. Id. at 635–37. 
100 Interestingly, the Third Circuit hinted in United States v. Stanley that simply 
connecting to an open Wi-Fi network may itself be a criminal act. Stanley, 753 
F.3d at 120 (“The presence of Stanley’s unauthorized signal was itself 
‘wrongful.’”). The court reasoned that Stanley “essentially hijacked his 
[n]eighbor’s router, forcing it to relay data to Comcast’s modem and back to his 
computer, all without either the [n]eighbor’s or Comcast’s knowledge or 
consent,” acting as a “virtual trespasser.” Id. The judge even went so far as to 
cite several state statutes that have “criminalized unauthorized access to a 
computer network.” Id. at n.10. While this issue was not the focus of the 
opinion, it has raised privacy concerns because the neighbor intentionally left 
their Wi-Fi open (or at least neglected to set a password) so it is difficult to see 
this act as a theft or trespass. See TechDirt, Appeals Court Says Using Open 
WiFi May Be a Crime, ABOVE THE LAW (June 13, 2014, 10:08AM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/06/appeals-court-says-using-open-wifi-may-be-a-
crime/ (stating it is “quite troubling” to have this language in an appeals court 
ruling). 
101 See Stanley, 753 F.3d at 116, for an example of good evidence of 
corroborating information. The officer used the MoocherHunter after knowing 
Defendant’s name, home address, and the MAC address of the suspected 
computer, and had evidence that the defendant was connected to the suspected 
network. This information was obtained because the router owner allowed the 
officer to set up a police computer in their home that was connected to the 
network Stanley was accessing. This allowed the officer to observe who 
connected to the network and link the activity to Stanley. If the router owner had 
refused, detectives would have presumably had greater difficulty in locating 
Stanley. See also U.S. v. Coca, 2016 WL 7013037 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2016).  
102 “For example, hacking is much more prevalent now than it was even nine 
years ago, and the rise of computer hacking via the Internet has changed the 
public’s reasonable expectations of privacy . . . . Now, it seems unreasonable to 
think that a computer connected to the Web is immune from invasion. Indeed, 
the opposite holds true: in today’s digital world, it appears to be a virtual 
APRIL 2017]Tracking Criminals with Internet Protocol Addresses 337 
passwords that are assigned by the ISP are found on the back of the 
device, and unless a user changes that password, anyone with 
access to that device can obtain the password.103 The ease with 
which a criminal can access a stranger’s Wi-Fi network in an 
attempt to avoid detection leads to the conclusion that further 
investigation is needed for search warrants.104 Devices such as the 
Shadow and the MoocherHunter can be employed to gather further 
information and, in conjunction with the router’s location, pinpoint 
a suspect.105 
ii. Additional Devices 
Courts have allowed law enforcement to use devices like the 
Shadow and MoocherHunter without a search warrant, and until a 
court declares them unlawful to use without a search warrant,106 
these mobile geo-location tools will be helpful. These devices 
measure signal strength, which in turn helps locate where the 
signal is originating from, and, as it stands today, there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in these transmissions.107 
Defendants argue that using these devices is like looking inside 
their home to view their activity.108 The government, on the other 
                                                                                                                                     
certainty that computers accessing the Internet can—and eventually will—be 
hacked.” United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 619 (E.D. Va. 2016). See 
also Aseem Kishore, Prevent Someone Else from Using Your Wireless Internet 
Connection, ONLINE TECH TIPS (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.online-tech-
tips.com/computer-tips/secure-wireless-connection/ (“Many people assume that 
setting a strong WiFi password is all they need, but this is not [the] case.”). 
 103 See Kishore, supra note 102. The author warns against keeping the long 
passwords that are assigned from the ISPs, often found on the device itself, 
because anyone “can still gain access by simply copying the password printed 
on your wireless router, since most people don’t change the default password set 
by their ISP.” Id. 
 104 Aaron Mackey, Seth Schoen & Cindy Cohn, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 




 105 See supra Section III.B. 
 106 See infra Section V.A. 
 107 United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 114 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 108 Id. at 117–18. 
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hand, explains that these signals are being sent outside the home 
and therefore are no longer private information.109 Likewise, no 
content on their devices is being searched or intercepted with these 
devices; solely their Internet signal is identified.110 Additionally, 
the police must have identified a radius of where the suspected 
user is before employing the device, meaning some preliminary 
search has been conducted prior to locating signals.111 
The National Institute of Justice also lists several tools for 
police to use, such as the Cantenna (a Wi-Fi detector) and the Air 
Magnet.112 Other experts urge police to search chat rooms, such as 
Reddit,113 in specific subgroups where the suspects may be likely 
to post about their crimes or provide tips for others on how to do 
                                                            
 109 Id. at 119 (explaining that Defendant projected his Internet signals outside 
of his home to connect to his neighbor’s network, therefore creating no 
reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 110 Id. 
 111 See United States v. Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615, at *1–2 (D. Or. Nov. 
28, 2012) The deputy identified ten suspect IP addresses in a neighborhood and 
the ISP subpoenas revealed that theses addresses were registered to six home 
residences in the neighborhood. With this information, the deputy used a signal 
reading device to observe when the IP addresses at these residences were 
accessing the website to share illegal content. Id. 
 112 A cantenna is used to extend the range of a wireless network or 
detect/intercept other wireless networks in the region. A Wi-Fi detector is used 
to locate wireless network signals. An Air Magnet monitors networks by 
intercepting or detecting signals. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Investigative Uses 
of Technology: Devices, Tools, and Techniques 44 (Oct. 2007), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213030.pdf (Each device is designed to 
“locate or intercept wireless communications from . . . computer networks.”). 
An explanatory scenario provided in the report explains how law enforcement 
identified an offender who was “illegally accessing the wireless hotspot of a 
local business in an effort to obtain anonymous Internet access” by turning down 
the signal strength of the network and observing a person who moved closer and 
closer to the building to remain connected, which led them to apprehend the 
offender. Id. at 46. 
 113 Reddit is a website that allows users to post links and stories for others to 
see and comment. “Subreddits” are individual communities for specific topics. 
See What is Reddit?, REDDIT HELP https://reddit.zendesk.com/hc/en-
us/articles/204511479-What-is-Reddit- (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
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the same.114 For a less invasive way to track criminals using the 
dark web, officials can check IP addresses with a list of Tor exit 
relays115 on ExoneraTor.116 If the IP address is also used as a Tor 
exit relay, then the IP owner is likely not a suspect.117 If a warrant 
application is still sought, this information should be included and 
explained so the court can determine if there is probable cause. 
Unfortunately, the dark web is a tricky place and new techniques 
will need to be used for proper searches. 
The use of these devices will likely remain controversial as 
cyber savvy criminals create new techniques to avoid detection. 
Concerns will continue to arise over whether the devices are an 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy and if new devices intrude 
further into private lives, thus constituting a Fourth Amendment 
violation. 
B. ISP Subpoenas 
As seen above, investigators must subpoena the ISP after 
identifying an IP address to locate the owner of the router.118 
Because the IP address obtained is that of the Internet router, not 
the actual device,119 this information can only marginally narrow 
their broad list of suspects. With non-password protected Wi-Fi, 
free Internet connections, and savvy Internet users able to hack 
                                                            
 114 See Alan Woodward, Viewpoint: How Hackers are Caught Out by Law 
Enforcers, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
17302656 (recounting how one hacker was discovered by law enforcement). 
 115 Mackey, Schoen & Cohn, supra note 104, at 18. “An exit relay is the final 
relay that Tor traffic passes through before it reaches its destination.” What Is a 
Tor Relay?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/torchallenge/what-is-
tor.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). 
 116 ExoneraTor is a database of all Tor exit relays. Mackey, Schoen & Cohn, 
supra note 104, at 18. 
 117 Id. (explaining that Tor exit relays are hosted by volunteers, therefore 
preserving anonymity). 
 118 See supra Section III. 
 119 Routers can be located anywhere and can be accessible to the public if the 
connection is through an unsecured network or the router is in a public place, 
such as a coffee shop or airport. See What Is a Router?, 
WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, http://whatismyipaddress.com/router (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2017). 
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into private Internet connections, more information is needed to 
justify a lawful search. As seen, police have searched incorrect 
homes and disrupted families, accusing loved ones of downloading 
child pornography, all because an unforeseeable criminal 
connected to their internet network.120 This is problematic because 
connecting to available wireless networks is common and devices 
often locate these available networks automatically.121 When the 
neighborhood gossip catches wind of the reasons police visited a 
home, rumors will spread and potentially tarnish their reputation. 
In the case of the pastor in Tennessee, rumors ruined eighteen 
months of his life with a false arrest on child pornography charges 
and forced his resignation from the church.122 The potential 
disruption, coupled with growing privacy concerns and distrust of 
law enforcement nationwide, could lead to a movement for a 
change in ISP policies that calls for greater protection of user 
data.123 
                                                            
 120 See Hoschar v. Layne, 647 F. App’x 632 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Broadhurst, 2012 WL 
5985615 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012). 
 121 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 112 (explaining that Windows 
operating systems can be configured to automatically scan for wireless 
networks). 
 122 Hoschar, 647 F. App’x at 634. 
 123 See Whitney Gibson, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR, & PEASE LLP, Subpoena 
Guide for Identifying Anonymous Internet Poster 6, n.1 (2014), 
http://internetdefamationblog.wp.lexblogs.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/297/2014/07/Supoena-Guide-for-Identifying-Anonymous-
Internet-Posters.pdf; see, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (explaining that ISPs that 
also provide cable services (Comcast, AT&T, TWC) are subject to the Cable 
Privacy Act, which prohibits these entities from releasing any personally 
identifying customer information without a court order), but see H.R. 1981, 
112th Cong. (2011). This proposed bill passed a House vote in 2011 but was 
never enacted into law. The Bill’s stated purpose was to aid in enforcing child 
exploitation laws by requiring ISPs to retain twelve months of logs of 
customers’ names, credit card information, and other identifying information. Id. 
This was thought by some privacy activists to allow law enforcement officials to 
identify a user’s personal habits, along with a fairly detailed picture of where 
they were each day. Id. 
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i. Privacy Concerns with ISP Subpoenas 
A move towards greater privacy protection took place when the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) passed “Protecting 
the Privacy of Customers of Broadband Data and Other 
Telecommunications Services in 2016,” aimed at protecting users’ 
personal data.124 This rule restricts what user information can be 
sold, shared, or traded with third parties, for example, 
advertisers.125 However, subpoenas carry more weight than third 
parties buying the information for advertising purposes, and the 
FCC rule does not address law enforcement issues.126 ISPs must 
respond to a subpoena, and there is little a user can do when his or 
her information is being hunted.127 More likely than not, a 
subscriber will not know their ISP received a subpoena for their 
information until after the information has been surrendered 
because consent is not needed to provide this to law 
enforcement.128 This is of great concern to users whose 
information is being subpoenaed without their knowledge because 
they often do not know they are being investigated until police 
come knocking at their door with a search warrant.129 If 
                                                            
 124 This rule was enacted on November 2, 2016 to “adopt a framework that 
provides heightened protections for sensitive customer information” because of 
the wide range of information broadband providers are able to obtain now. FCC 
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 
Telecommunications Services, 47 C.F.R. § 64.2 (2016). The rule requires 
carriers to “obtain customers’ opt-in approval for use and sharing of sensitive 
customer [personal information] . . . [and] opt-out approval for the use and 
sharing of non-sensitive customer [personal information.]” Id. at 5. For an 
example of the opt-in opt-out policies, see AT&T Privacy Policy: Your Rights & 
Choices, AT&T, http://about.att.com/sites/privacy_policy/rights_choices (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2017). 
 125 Kate Cox, FCC Adopts New Privacy Rule Limiting What ISPs Can Do 
With Your Personal Data, CONSUMERIST (Oct. 27. 2016, 10:42 AM), 
https://consumerist.com/2016/10/27/fcc-adopts-new-privacy-rule-limiting-what-
isps-can-do-with-your-personal-data/. 
 126 47 C.F.R. § 64 (2016). 
 127  Frequently Asked Questions for Subpoena Targets, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/frequently-asked-questions-subpoena-
targets#prevent_disclosure (last visited Jan. 10, 2017). 
 128 See, e.g., Privacy Policy: Information We Share, supra note 13. 
 129 See Frequently Asked Questions for Subpoena Targets, supra note 127. 
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notification is received, the subscriber can file a motion to quash 
the subpoena, however, aside from this request, nothing else can be 
done.130 This creates privacy concerns for users and ISPs who want 
their subscribers to feel secure in sharing their information. 
Notably, the new FCC chairman under President Trump’s 
administration has already begun moves to undo key aspects of the 
recently enacted FCC rule, creating uncertainty for privacy 
regulations moving forward because of the amount of customer 
information that could be shared between ISPs, web browsers, and 
companies seeking to buy customer data.131 The more people who 
have access to this information, the easier it may become to 
misidentify suspected criminals using only IP address information. 
The FCC’s rule, though, as enacted in 2016, serves as a strong 
indicator that the federal government is beginning to respond to 
users’ demands for greater privacy protection of their data.132 
There are also time limits on how long ISPs keep data that law 
enforcement officials will find valuable, such as what websites a 
user visits, along with the time and date of the visit.133 Given the 
sheer volume of data, most providers keep these records for only 
six to nine months.134 Consequently, law enforcement officials 
must act relatively quickly when they identify a potential suspect, 
possibly leading to a hurried investigation to obtain a search 
                                                            
 130 Id. 
 131 Jeff Dunn, Republicans Are Moving To Kill Rules That’d Make Internet 
Providers Get Your Consent Before Selling Your Web Browsing Data, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-congress-may-
overturn-obama-internet-privacy-rules-2017-3. 
 132 Jon Brodkin, FCC Imposes ISP Privacy Rules and Takes Aim at 
Mandatory Arbitration, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 27, 2016 12:17 PM), 
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/10/isps-will-soon-have-to-
ask-you-before-sharing-private-data-with-advertisers/. But, ISPs are not happy 
about this and law enforcement officials would likely not be either if it makes 
their investigations more difficult. 
 133Alex Wawro, FAQ: Will Your ISP Protect Your Privacy?, PCWORLD (Oct. 
11, 2016, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/241591/faq_will_your_isp_protect_your_privac
y_.html. 
 134 See Gibson, supra note 123, at n.1. 
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warrant prior to the information being deleted.135 Police need to 
reconcile the desire to move quickly and the necessity to ensure 
rights are not violated. Search warrants should not be granted when 
only an IP address and information from the ISP is known, because 
this does not provide specific enough identifying information. It is 
therefore important for law enforcement officials to have other 
techniques in place to corroborate information beyond an IP 
address, which is public information. 
ii. ISPs Begin to Push Back 
ISPs have begun to implement data protection policies to 
ensure subscribers that their information is not being sold or 
accessed without their permission.136 As it stands, ISPs are under 
no obligation to retain user’s data, such as Internet browsing 
history, for any period of time.137 This creates problems for law 
enforcement officials when they seek information about an IP 
address that was used beyond what the ISP has in storage.138 For 
example, Comcast stores IP address information for 180 days and 
states in their Retention Policy that if they are asked for identifying 
information “used more than 180 days prior to receipt of the 
request, Comcast will not have information to provide.”139 There 
are two potential explanations for this: (1) ISPs do not have the 
                                                            
 135 See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 2010) (“By 
the time government agents got the IP addresses [of the suspects], there was not 
enough time to subpoena customer identities from the ISPs before the ISPs had 
purged their records reflecting which IP addresses had been assigned to which 
customers.”). It was not until the FBI gained administrator-level access to the 
child pornography website that they were able to obtain the IP addresses of 
those posting and viewing illegal content. 
 136 FCC Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 
Telecommunications Services, 47 C.F.R. § 64.4 (2016) (explaining the new 
FCC rule requires broadband providers to have opt-in approval from customers 
to share personal information and “material retroactive changes” must be made 
to privacy policies to reflect the this). 
 137 Ernesto Van der Sar, How Long Does Your ISP Store IP-Address Logs?, 
TORRENTFREAK (June 29, 2012), https://torrentfreak.com/how-long-does-your-
isp-store-ip-address-logs-120629/. 
 138 Comcast Legal Response Center, Law Enforcement Handbook: Retention 
Policies, supra note 24. 
 139 Id. 
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storage capacity to retain all this customer data for extended 
periods of time, so they must purge it frequently,140 or (2) ISPs are 
beginning to make small moves towards greater protection of 
customer’s data. These greater protections include frequently 
deleting this information, similar to an individual clearing his or 
her browsing history.141 Both of these are probable explanations. 
Given the amount of data that ISPs receive daily, it is not feasible 
to maintain storage for long periods.142 Moreover, after notable 
cases such as the FBI’s feud with Apple143 and Yahoo,144 ISPs 
have come under scrutiny from customers that companies are not 
adequately protecting their data.145 
It is a bit worrisome to leave power in the hands of ISPs to re-
write data privacy rules because law enforcement has a vested 
interest in being able to access identifying information of 
suspected criminals. Users can “spoof” their IP address to re-route 
to another address,146 and ISPs similarly allow users to obtain new 
                                                            
 140See Gibson, supra note 123, at n.1. 
 141 See 47 C.F.R. § 64 (evidencing that ISPs will be required by law to ensure 
some customer data remains private through opt-in and opt-out rules). 
 142 While there are no data retention laws in the United States, ISPs generally 
do not retain customer data for long periods. Some worry this would create a 
large source of private data that would be enticing to hackers and accidental 
disclosures. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., Mandatory Data Retention, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/mandatory-data-retention (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). 
 143 Arash Khamooshi, Breaking Down Apple’s iPhone Fight with the U.S. 
Government, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/03/technology/apple-iphone-fbi-
fight-explained.html. 
 144 Andy Greenberg, How Did The Feds Get Past Yahoo’s Encryption? 
Yahoo!, WIRED (Oct. 4, 2016, 5:56 pm), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/10/yahoo-spy-scandal-shows-encryption-fails-
without-backbone/. 
 145 FCC Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 
Telecommunications Services, 47 C.F.R. § 64.3 (2016) (explaining this 
regulation was enacted in response to users’ requests for increased protection of 
their data, specifically in regards to selling customer data). 
 146 “Spoofing” is used to disguise IP addresses by re-routing through those 
trying to determine where the router is to another computer or by providing a 
false IP address. See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises 
Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
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IP addresses when they desire.147 This is similar to clearing your 
browsing history to remove any Internet searches that may point 
towards evidence of illegal activity. These methods of concealing 
identities harm both the ISPs and the government because ISPs use 
customers’ history logs to improve browsing capabilities, provide 
relevant advertisements, and make other improvements.148 This 
also harms government officials because it severely complicates 
their ability to track criminals online.149 A workable solution must 
include compromises on both sides. 
But, what other options could ISPs provide to their customers 
to help them feel secure that their privacy is being protected? It 
will go beyond fighting the government’s desire to have a 
backdoor into ISP’s records.150 An FCC rule enacted in 2016 
allows users to opt-in and opt-out of sharing certain data, showing 
the possibility that ISPs may request more information from the 
government when they receive subpoenas for customer 
information.151 While the rule did not affect law enforcement 
                                                            
 147 How to Change Your IP Address, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, 
http://whatismyipaddress.com/change-ip (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
 148 See Privacy Policy: How We Use Information We Collect, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/#infouse (last visited Feb. 16, 2017). 
149 See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(where the government was unable to receive information from an ISP 
because the ISP had already purged the data). 
 150 The geopolitical climate and national security concerns will prevent ISPs 
from allowing United States law enforcement officials to have a backdoor 
mechanism into their software, precisely so that they will not have to allow other 
foreign governments to do the same. See Khamooshi, supra note 143 
(contending that if Apple allowed the United States government to overcome the 
encryption then they would be hard pressed to deny other countries, such as 
China, the same access). 
 151 But see FCC, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai on 
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 
Telecommunications Services, (Nov. 2, 2016) 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-148A1.pdf, where, 
interestingly, the new head of the FCC strongly dissented in the adoption of this 
Rule. Pai’s strongest criticism of the Rule is that ISPs are now subject to stricter 
regulations than edge providers, such as Google and Yahoo, who are regulated 
by the Federal Trade Commission. Id. at 209. He disagrees with the FCC’s 
justification that ISPs need greater regulation because they have access to a 
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issues, if search warrants continue to be granted based on IP 
address information only, it is likely that ISPs will begin to 
question the probable cause associated with the subpoenas more 
often.152 If tension occurs between law enforcement and ISPs, ISPs 
could begin to request more information from officials or alert 
customers before they disclose the information sought. This 
inevitably lengthens the process of receiving information from the 
ISPs and government officials then run the risk of the data being 
automatically purged during the discourse. Without that data, the 
government will presumably lose a large portion of its evidence 
against the suspect.153 
                                                                                                                                     
“vast sea” of customer data, while edge providers only see a “slice” of this data. 
Id. at 210. This could be a sign that ISPs, moving forward, will not be subject to 
further regulations that allow customers greater control over how their data is 
being used. This certainly guarantees a fight between privacy activists and the 
FCC over how to treat this data, leading to belief that a regulatory alternative 
may not be politically feasible. Notably, a few months after its enactment, the 
Senate voted to overturn the Rule. See Chris Mills, ISPs Can Now Sell Your 
Browsing History Without Permission, Thanks to the Senate, BGR (Mar. 23, 
2017, 1:42PM), http://bgr.com/2017/03/23/fcc-privacy-rules-senate-overturned-
ajit-pai/. 
 152 See infra Section V.B. 
 153 See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 2010) (where the 
FBI was unable to subpoena the ISP for customer information because the ISPs 
no longer had that data saved). A similar situation arose in the Tenth Circuit, 
notably in a decision authored by Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch, that 
found the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children’s (“NCMEC”) 
action of opening e-mails forwarded to them by AOL was an unconstitutional 
search under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 
1292, 1304–07 (10th Cir. 2016). Judge Gorsuch’s decision rested on the fact that 
this was a “warrantless opening and examination of (presumptively) private 
correspondence” that the Fourth Amendment protects. Id. at 1307. The NCMEC 
is a government entity that receives and investigates tips about possible child 
trafficking instances, and AOL forwarded a user’s e-mail that they suspected 
contained illegal content. (AOL noticed certain hashes in the e-mail that had 
been previously associated with child pornography photographs.) The NCMEC 
opened the attachment to determine if the e-mail had illegal images, which it 
did. The Tenth Circuit found that NCMEC needed to obtain a warrant before 
they could open the attachments, which seems to put NCMEC’s ability to 
investigate at a disadvantage and could hinder the efficiency and effectiveness 
of their work. Interview by Steven Baker, Steptoe Cyberlaw Podcast: Interview 
with Jason Healey, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Feb. 6, 2017) 
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V. INVASION OF PRIVACY CONCERNS 
Some of the current investigative tools law enforcement 
officials use raise privacy concerns. Some courts espouse the 
viewpoint that “[l]aw enforcement cannot afford to be hamstrung 
by technologically creative criminals,”154 conceivably suggesting 
that greater deference will be given to investigative techniques 
regardless of privacy intrusions. This section presents the privacy 
concerns created by signal monitoring devices, as seen in Section 
III, and analyzes a new malware technique used by the FBI to 
obtain IP addresses that edges closer towards an unconstitutional 
search under the Fourth Amendment. 
A. Concerns with Signal Monitoring Devices 
First, defendants have alleged that use of signal devices like the 
Shadow and MoocherHunter is an invasion into a user’s private 
home.155 While the government tends to view suspects who use a 
stranger’s Wi-Fi network without permission as “virtual 
trespassers,” the defendants generally make the argument that the 
government is trespassing into their private home.156 The oft-cited 
case to support the idea that signal monitoring is an invasion is 
Kyllo v. United States,157 where officers parked across the street 
                                                                                                                                     
(http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2017/02/06/steptoe-cyberlaw-podcast-
interview-with-jason-healey-2/). This important decision evidences at least one 
circuit’s, and a potential Supreme Court Justice’s, willingness “to be skeptical 
about government authority.” Id. 
 154 United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 
4208436, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (reasoning this especially applies 
“when what is at risk is the sexual exploitation and sadistic abuse of children”). 
This reasoning could also lead to prejudicial views by courts depending on what 
the crime is. In Acevedo-Lemus, the judge suggested that “the unspeakable harm 
caused by child pornography” was a large factor in the ultimate decision to deny 
suppression of the evidence obtained using the NIT, whereas other courts have 
allowed suppression of this evidence. Id. 
 155 See generally United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 118-19 (3d Cir. 
2014) (explaining Stanley alleged an unconstitutional search occurred when the 
detective “used the MoocherHunter to trace Stanley’s wireless signal back to the 
interior of his home”). 
 156 Id. at 120. 
 157 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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and used a thermal imager to determine the existence of a 
marijuana growing operation inside the residence.158 The scanner 
showed that certain parts of the defendant’s home were unusually 
warm, leading officers to conclude that high-powered lamps used 
to grow marijuana were inside.159 The Supreme Court declared 
“obtaining [information] by sense-enhancing technology . . . [from 
the] interior of the home that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area[] constitutes a search,” and therefore the search 
inside Kyllo’s home was unconstitutional.160  
While this seemingly bright-line rule that use of “sense-
enhancing technology” is unconstitutional without a search 
warrant, the rules have changed when it comes to Internet activity 
because these signals are projected outside the home. Kyllo’s 
reasoning has not been persuasive in court given the growing belief 
that IP addresses are not private information and the steps 
necessary to connect to the Internet are not private. This argument 
is also unlikely to be convincing in the future because courts have 
routinely used a nuance in Scalia’s opinion regarding sensing 
technology to defend law enforcement’s use of these devices — 
“without physical intrusion.”161 
Moreover, defendants often claim that their criminal activities 
were conducted within their home, purposefully shielded from the 
public eye, and should be protected from this type of “search.”162 
                                                            
158 Id. at 29–30. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 34 (internal citations omitted). 
 161 Compare Stanley, 753 F.3d at 119 (where court upheld use of signal 
monitoring device to detect Internet signals) with Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (where 
court found use of sense-enhancing technology to obtain information that would 
otherwise have only been obtainable through physical intrusion into the home 
was unconstitutional). 
 162 Stanley, 753 F.3d at 119 (“In effect, Stanley opened his window and 
extended an invisible, virtual arm across the street to the Neighbor’s router so 
that he could exploit his Internet connection. In so doing, Stanley deliberately 
ventured beyond the privacy protections of the home, and thus, beyond the safe 
harbor provided by Kyllo.”). But see United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 
1307 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that the NCMEC conducted an unconstitutional 
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Courts have found that intentionally sending out Internet signals in 
search of a network connection makes these signals public.163 
Additionally, many of the crimes that are conducted on the Internet 
involve file sharing, which requires projecting not only network 
signals outside of the home, but also interactions with third 
parties.164 These interactions lessen the legitimacy of claims to 
privacy. It seems that using a computer inside of your home to 
conduct Internet activity is not enough to insulate a user from law 
enforcement officials and other monitoring of one’s online 
conduct. 
These conclusions seem in accordance with the Supreme 
Court’s precedent in Kyllo, but it raises the question of where the 
line is drawn for law enforcement officials to gather information 
that otherwise could not be viewed “without physical intrusion.” 
Courts are slow to adapt to the rapidly changing technological 
world, and lawyers likewise are not well equipped, nor do they 
have the time and resources, to fully account for the changing 
landscape of the Internet.165 The precedent thus far gives law 
enforcement a broad use of power to “peer inside” a user’s home 
by monitoring signals that, by their very nature, must be projected 
outside the confines of the private home to conduct activity on the 
Internet. As these investigations become more intrusive due to the 
prevailing view that Internet activity is not private, defendants and 
privacy advocates worry about the future of online privacy. 
                                                                                                                                     
search when they opened previously unopened e-mails forwarded to them by 
AOL that contained child pornography photographs). 
 163 United States v. Broadhurst, No. 3:11-CR-00121-MO-1, 2012 WL 
5985615, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012) (“[D]efendant voluntarily sent out a 
signal to amplify access point signals and attach to third parties’ networks with 
his computer.”). 
 164 Stanley, 753 F.3d at 119-20 (“Stanley made no effort to confine his 
conduct to the interior of his home. [H]is conduct—sharing child pornography 
with other Internet users via a stranger’s Internet connection—was deliberately 
projected outside of his home, as it required interactions with persons and 
objects beyond the threshold of his residence.”). 
 165 Mackey, Schoen & Cohn, supra note 104. 
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B. Concerns with Future Techniques 
Criminals have turned to the dark web to evade detection from 
law enforcement’s signal monitoring.166 Matters inevitably become 
more complicated when criminals use the dark web to intentionally 
remain anonymous, leading officials to use techniques that test the 
limits of Fourth Amendment privacy protections.167 A sampling of 
the main privacy concerns that have arisen involve (i) government 
searches of computers through hacking techniques involving 
malware and (ii) magistrate judges issuing warrants that are 
executed nationwide, outside the district in which they were 
granted. 
i. Government “Hacking” 
An explanatory example of what the FBI recently did to 
circumvent this so-called anonymity on the dark web can be seen 
in the nationwide Playpen cases.168 A child pornography site 
known as Playpen was hosted and used on the Tor network169 
where users were anonymous.170 After receiving a tip from a 
                                                            
 166 Tor: Overview, supra note 37. 
 167  These issues include government “hacking,” whether a search was 
conducted on the suspect’s computer to retrieve information, and debate about 
whether the search warrant particularly described the place to be searched. See 
generally Orin Kerr, Government ‘Hacking’ and the Playpen Search Warrant, 




 168 See generally United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 612 (E.D. Va. 
2016). 
 169 See generally Untied States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 
2016 WL 4208436, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016). The Tor network, and other 
dark web browsers, operate differently than ordinary websites that log the IP 
addresses of visitors after they visit the site. To access the Tor network, “a user 
must first download and install particular software, which subsequently shields 
the user’s IP address by relaying it among ‘nodes’—computers run by 
volunteers all over the world. When a user visits a website located on the Tor 
network . . . his actual IP address is not shown. Instead, [the site] can only see 
the IP address of the Tor ‘exit node’ – the final relay computer which sent the 
user’s communication to [the site].” Id. 
 170 Id. at *1-2. 
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foreign informant of the host’s IP address, the FBI located the host 
and used his connection to infiltrate the computers of the other 
anonymous users.171 The FBI used a “Network Investigative 
Technique” (“NIT”) to send malware to users who accessed the 
website by running the site for a short period of time.172 Once the 
user logged into the site and downloaded content, the malware was 
subsequently downloaded with the selected image.173 This malware 
allowed the FBI to obtain IP addresses of users and later obtain 
home addresses after subpoenaing their ISP.174 Federal courts 
across the nation have declared the use of the NIT was legal, 
despite vocal privacy advocates who have declared this was an 
illegal search and seizure.175 
Defendants who were subject to the FBI’s NIT allege that by 
sending them the malware to identify their IP addresses, the FBI 
conducted a Fourth Amendment search of their device because the 
malware was programmed to “search” their computer for this 
information.176 This is an important assertion that most courts who 
heard these cases tended to brush aside.177 It is well established 
that users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
IP address because invariably they disclose it at least once to 
access the web.178 The NIT created a different situation though. 
While the Tor users disclosed their IP address to the first node 
host, the FBI did not obtain the userss IP address from those hosts, 
or from the ISP as was done in the cases in Section III.179 This is 
an important distinction because, rather than subpoenaing the third 
party for the IP address, the FBI obtained the IP address only after 
they installed a program on the suspect’s computer that then 
                                                            
 171 Id. at *2-3. 
 172 Id. at *2-4. 
 173 Id. at *2. 
 174 Id. at *5. 
 175 Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4. 
 176 Id. at *5. 
 177 See generally id. 
 178 Tor: Overview, supra note 37. 
 179 United States v. Allain, 2016 WL 5660452, at *13 n.5 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 
2016). 
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searched through the computer for the address.180 Therefore, the 
FBI searched the contents of the suspects’ computers.181 Some 
courts have said that the initial disclosure of the IP address to the 
first node renders the address non-private information.182 
Therefore, it does not matter how the FBI obtained this non-private 
information, even if it involved a warrantless search.183 The initial 
disclosure is all that matters to render a warrant unnecessary.184 
Once law enforcement officials can “search” computers for 
specific information without a warrant, whether it is private 
information or not, there is no telling how far this broad grant of 
power could extend.185 
                                                            
180 Id. (“The FBI’s search not only implicated defendant’s privacy interest in 
his IP address, but also in his computer.”). 
 181 Id.; but see Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *6. 
182 United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 
4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal, Aug. 8, 2016). 
 183 Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *6 (“[A] necessary aspect of Tor is 
the initial transmission of a user’s IP address to a third-party—the operator of 
the initial Tor node—and the fact that a user’s IP address is subsequently 
bounced from node to node within the Tor network to mask his identity does not 
alter the analysis of whether he had an actual expectation of privacy in that IP 
address, which he had initially disclosed to a stranger.”) (internal citations 
omitted); but see Kerr, Government ‘Hacking’, supra note 165 (arguing that Tor 
users do not voluntarily share their IP addresses with the websites they visit, and 
so it does not matter that obtaining an IP address in other situations would not be 
a search, it was a search in these cases because it was the “absence of voluntarily 
sharing . . . [that] led the government to surreptitiously obtain the information 
using the NIT” in the first place). 
 184 Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *6. 
 185 See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 
F. Supp. 2d 753, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2013). The court denied a warrant request to 
install software designed to extract certain stored electronic records and generate 
photographs and location information over a thirty-day period, which amounted 
to simply “a warrant to hack a computer suspected of criminal use.” The 
government failed to assure the court that only information of the suspected 
criminals would be gathered and did not address various concerns such as 
whether the suspects used public computers, whether it belonged to family 
members who were not involved in the illegal scheme, whether a counterfeit 
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than one computer. Id. at 759-60. Additionally, “[s]ome privacy advocates and 
analysts worry that in doing so, investigators may also wind up hacking and 
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On the one hand, this type of “hacking” may be necessary in 
the world of the dark web where criminals go to great lengths to 
remain undetected.186 One court dealing with the Tor network 
stated, “the government should be able to use the most advanced 
technological means to overcome criminal activity that is 
conducted in secret.”187 However, the steps government officials 
have already taken seem to be pushing the limit. What if the FBI, 
in addition to searching for the IP address, was also able to access 
credit card information, social security numbers, and other 
personally identifying information from their “search” of the 
suspect’s computer? As the NIT was used, personally identifying 
information was not searched for per se, and so the suspects’ 
names and addresses were obtained from a subpoena to the ISP 
associated with the IP address found using the malware.188 It is not 
difficult to imagine a situation where law enforcement could easily 
program the malware to search for even one piece of identifying 
information, such as to obtain access to passwords the suspect used 
for various sites. In one Playpen case, the FBI filed for voluntary 
dismissal of charges against the Defendant because they did not 
want to reveal the details of the malware they used to hack into the 
                                                                                                                                     
identifying the computers of law-abiding people who are seeking to remain 
anonymous, people who can also include political dissidents and journalists.” 
Ellen Nakashima, This Is How the Government is Catching People Who Use 
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officials said, it would be very difficult to locate pedophiles who go to great 
lengths to hide their tracks.”). 
 187 Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *6 (quoting United States v. 
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 188 Id. at *2. But see United States v. Croghan, 2016 WL 4992105, at *7 (S.D. 
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Tor network during discovery.189 This seems to create problems for 
both parties involved as the public would like to know what 
techniques law enforcement is using, but there is also an interest in 
keeping some aspects private so criminals cannot surpass detection 
techniques. The more access law enforcement has to private 
information without a warrant, the closer they move towards 
conducting an unconstitutional search. 
On the other hand, if law enforcement officials are not able to 
obtain this information using malware (or another similar method), 
they may turn to third parties who are able get the information,190 
granting access to this information to more parties in addition to 
law enforcement. For example, the FBI enlisted the help of a third-
party company when Apple refused to unlock the phone of the 
suspect in the San Bernardino attack.191 Privacy experts have been 
vocal about preventing any “back door” mechanism for the 
government to bypass encryption and password protection 
methods, fearing that this will allow the government to have 
unfettered access to information.192 In the changing cyber world, 
courts are struggling to address the interconnectivity of all users. 
Using malware is a direct way courts allow law enforcement to 
access criminals online, but a procedurally important aspect has 
risen to the surface as well: the territorial reach of warrants for 
searching Internet activity. 
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ii. Legality of Warrants for All Users on a Website with Illegal 
Content 
The other main issue in the Playpen cases dealt with the 
legality of the warrant issued to use the NIT.193 A magistrate judge 
in the Eastern District of Virginia issued a warrant, but the 
malware was used—via downloading by users on the website—all 
across the country.194 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41, a magistrate judge “has authority to issue a warrant to search 
for and seize a person or property located within the district.”195 
The FBI allowed the malware to be downloaded on thousands of 
computers outside the Eastern District of Virginia, outside the 
legally admissible jurisdiction.196 Some courts found the warrant 
was valid, despite users being outside the Eastern District of 
Virginia, reasoning that the users made “a virtual trip via the 
Internet to Virginia” putting them within the reach of the warrant 
to be a legal search.197 This is a broad construction of the warrant’s 
jurisdiction and a view not all courts have been ready to follow.198 
Other courts found the NIT being downloaded outside the 
Eastern District of Virginia was a Rule 41 violation.199 As a result, 
these courts were compelled to suppress the evidence found using 
the NIT because it violated the Fourth Amendment.200 Even though 
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the government argued that “suppression [was] too extreme a 
remedy” and undoubtedly was a “victory” for the defendant who 
illegally downloaded child pornography, the court found the 
evidence obtained in the violation was simply too prejudicial to be 
admissible.201 The IP addresses of defendants would not have been 
obtained but for the malware being sent outside of the magistrate’s 
jurisdiction. The government often argues that this is a ministerial 
violation, but courts have found this to be a procedural violation 
that involved “substantial judicial authority.”202 In essence, “the 
magistrate judge lacked authority, and thus jurisdiction” to issue 
the warrant, rendering it invalid.203 
The disagreement regarding jurisdictional limits of search 
warrants for information regarding technological devices poses a 
problem because defendants who were subject to the same search 
warrant from accessing the same website are being treated 
differently across the nation, raising judicial uncertainty for 
defendants. Recently, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure was amended to address these concerns.204 The 
amendments allow a magistrate judge “to issue a warrant to use 
remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or 
copy electronically stored information located within or outside 
that district if . . . the media . . . has been concealed through 
technological means [] or . . . [is] located in five or more 
districts.”205 These amendments establish the NIT warrant was 
valid because the rule allows warrants to reach beyond the 
jurisdiction where they are issued. However, even though courts 
prior to these amendments acknowledged that a “potent 
investigative technique” such as the NIT could someday be 
authorized under Rule 41, the privacy rights of individuals must 
still be respected with the “extremely intrusive nature of such a 
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search.”206 As a clear standard of what law enforcement officials 
can do in online searches is being established, it is important that 
Fourth Amendment privacy concerns are protected. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
IP addresses are useful for locating criminals and provide a 
stepping-stone for launching subsequent investigations. 
Nevertheless, judges should persist to request more specific 
information before granting search warrants. With the advent of 
freely available information regarding users’ online conduct, it is 
not unduly burdensome for officials to obtain additional 
information to support pending searches. With an IP address, for 
example, officials can first subpoena the ISP for customer 
information which can then be used to corroborate a suspect’s 
online identity. From there, signal monitoring devices can be used 
to observe where the suspected online conduct originates. These 
additional steps are necessary to ensure proper judicial prudence 
when conducting new investigations. 
As techniques become more intrusive, both officials and users 
must be wary about privacy concerns. Users must take extra steps 
to ensure their networks are secured and should actively check to 
see if any unauthorized users are accessing their network. 
Additionally, law enforcement officials carry a heavy burden 
themselves and must tread carefully so as not to cross into 
unconstitutional search territory. IP addresses do not always 
provide concrete details about a suspect’s identity, so caution 
should be used when invasive techniques are used to obtain a 
suspect’s IP address. As seen in cases where criminals use dark 
web browsers, IP addresses can easily be relayed among various 
different computers across the country or can be re-routed to 
another device. Officials should be hesitant to use invasive 
techniques to obtain this information, as it could prove fruitless to 
their search, particularly given some courts’ decisions to suppress 
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evidence because legal procedures were not followed.207 Similarly, 
if officials successfully bring charges against a suspect but are 
compelled to reveal specific details about their search techniques, 
they may choose to dismiss the criminal charges against the 
suspect, rather than have to reveal their method.208 These concerns, 
among others, are shaping a new landscape for investigating 
criminal activity online. IP addresses alone should not provide 
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